Abstract. This study explores the macroeconomic implications of adaptive expectations in a standard growth model. We show that the self-confirming equilibrium under adaptive expectations is the same as the steady state rational expectations equilibrium for all admissible parameter values, but that dynamics around the steady state are substantially different between the two equilibria. The differences are driven mainly by the dampened wealth effect and the strengthened intertemporal substitution effect, not by escapes emphasized by Williams (2003) .
learning rules in a RBC model. The learning rules that he considers do not separate agents' beliefs and their decision making. Agents are learning about the structural parameters in the reduced form of the model and the learning does not influence optimizing decisions. Under this type of learning, Williams (2003) finds that learning dynamics differ very little from rational expectations dynamics. Consequently, one would have concluded that learning dynamics do not teach us anything new, as compared to the rational expectations version of the RBC model.
In this paper, we reexamine this conclusion in the standard RBC model with both neutral and investment-specific technology shocks. Following the commonly-used learning mechanism studied by Marcet and Nicolini (2003) and Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2006a) , we examine the implications of misspecified (i.e., under-parameterized) learning rules by separating agents' beliefs and their decision rules.
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Rational expectations are simply replaced by adaptive expectations, while all decision equations under rational expectations remain intact. We show that this slight departure from rational expectations has important ramifications. Specifically, we address the following questions:
• Does there exist a self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) in our learning environment? Is it unique?
• Are there strong escape dynamics away from the domain of attraction of the SCE?
• How does learning amplify the effects of technology shocks compared to rational expectations?
• How does learning affect the transmission mechanisms of technology shocks, especially in the labor market?
To answer these questions, we obtain closed form solutions for both the log-linearized rational expectations model and the corresponding learning model. These analytical solutions enable us to prove the existence and uniqueness of the SCE under all admissible parameterizations in our learning model. We further prove that the SCE coincides with the steady state rational expectations equilibrium (REE), but that learning dynamics are substantially different from rational expectations dynamics.
2 Williams (2003) studies another misspecified learning in which agents do not know the true parameters of the production function. By assuming full depreciation of the capital stock, an i.i.d. technology process, and inelastic labor, he shows that learning leads to occasional, but recurrent, large deviations away from an SCE, called "escape dynamics." For other studies of escape dynamics, see Sargent (1999) , Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002) , Kasa (2004) , and Adam, Evans, and Honkapohja (in press).
Unlike Marcet and Nicolini (2003) , Williams (2003) , and Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2006a) , however, we show that learning dynamics are stationary and that the differences between learning dynamics and rational-expectations dynamics are not driven by escape dynamics.
These theoretical results enable one to draw macroeconomic implications from our learning model. The dynamic responses of output, consumption, investment, and labor hours, following a neutral technology shock, are substantially larger in the adaptive expectations model than in the rational expectations model. In the rational expectations equilibrium, hours change too little and the real wage fluctuates too much compared to the data. In contrast, learning amplifies the response of hours and dampens the response of the real wage. In our adaptive expectations model, agents form forecasts of future capital stock based on the past observations. Thus, introducing learning dampens the wealth effect of the neutral technology shock and strengthens the intertemporal substitution effect. Consequently, it helps amplify the effects of the neutral technology shock on output and investment and improve the model's predictions on the labor market dynamics. Introducing learning also helps amplify the effects of a biased technology shock.
The responses of hours to both types of technology shocks can be negative after initial periods in the learning model, whereas the hours responses to each of the two shocks are positive in the rational expectations model. The less persistent the shocks are, the more pronounced the negative responses of hours under learning can become.
Furthermore, the learning model is more likely to generate hump-shaped responses of consumption, investment, real wage, and hours, the less persistent the shocks are.
To relate our work to a broader literature on learning, we also examine a sophisticated nonlinear learning rule that has a correct specification of the rational expectations solution. Consistent with the results reported by Carceles-Poveda and
Giannitsarou (2007), we find that the transmission and propagation mechanisms of technology shocks depend crucially on initial conditions, the size of the shocks, and the size of the gain. We illustrate some cases where learning generates strong amplification effects of the technology shocks. In particular, we show that adaptive learning, acting as a friction, is capable of generating negative responses of hours to a neutral technology shock, as documented by some recent empirical studies (e.g., Galí (1999) , Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) , Gambetti (2006) ).
Overall, our results suggest that introducing adaptive expectations in the standard stochastic growth model can assign a more important role for technology shocks to generate fluctuations in key macroeconomic variables than under rational expectations. Introducing learning can be particular helpful in improving the model's predictions in the labor market.
II. The Model
In this section, we describe the standard growth model with both neutral and biased technologies. The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived and identical households. The representative household is endowed with a unit of time.
The household derives utility from consumption and leisure, with the utility function
where C t denotes consumption, L t denotes labor hours, β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the subjective discount factor, and E 0 denotes an expectation at the initial time 0.
The economy is also populated by a continuum of identical, perfectly competitive firms. The representative firm has access to a constant returns to scale technology represented by the production function
where Y t denotes output, K t−1 denotes capital input, and L t denotes labor input. The term Z t denotes the neutral technological change and follows the stochastic process
where λ z is the trend component and ν t is the stationary component that follows the AR(1) process
The persistence parameter ρ ν ∈ (0, 1] and the shock ε νt is a white noise process with mean zero and variance σ 2 ν . The shock process specified in (3)-(4) implies that, if 0 < ρ ν < 1, then the neutral technology follows a stationary stochastic process with a deterministic trend; if ρ ν = 1, then the neutral technology follows a random walk process with a drift.
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The economy has an initial stock of capital denoted by K −1 . Capital stock evolves over time according to the law of motion
where K t denotes the period-t capital stock, I t denotes investment, Q t denotes the investment-specific technological change (the inverse of the relative price of investment goods, and the parameter δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the capital depreciation rate. As argued in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) , the investment-specific technological change is an important driving force of the U.S. growth in the post-war period. Similar to the neutral technology, we assume that the investment-specific technology shock Q t follows the stochastic process
where λ q is the trend component and µ t is the stationary component that follows the AR(1) process
The persistence parameter ρ µ ∈ (0, 1) and the innovation term ε µt is white-noise process with mean zero and variance σ 2 µ . Again, our specification of the Q t process here nests the random-walk process as a special case with ρ µ = 1.
The aggregate resource constraint is given by
III. Equilibrium Allocation and Balanced Growth
Since the model economy has perfect competition and no externality, the First Welfare Theorem applies. Thus, the equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient and can be found by solving a social planner's problem.
The social planner maximizes the representative household's utility (1) subject to the resource constraint (8) and the capital law of motion (5). The first order conditions imply that
On the balanced growth path, C t , I t , and Y t grow at the same rate of λ z λ
(1−α)/α q while the capital stock K t grows at a faster rate of λ z λ 1/α q . We define the following stationary variables
Given these stationary variables, we can rewrite the equilibrium conditions (2), (5), (8), (9), and (10) asỸ
Denote
q . It follows from the above conditions that the steady state equilibrium can be described by the following equations
whereỸ ,C,Ĩ, andK are the steady state values ofỸ t ,C t ,Ĩ t , andK t . The consumptionoutput and investment-output ratios can derived from the above steady state conditions:
4 An alternative approach to induce stationarity in the model is to detrend the variable by its deterministic trend. For instance, one can defineX t = Log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions (11), (12), (13), (14), and (15) and rearranging the terms, we obtain the following five equations describing the production function, the law of motion for capital accumulation, the resource constraint, the optimal consumption-labor-supply decision, and the optimal investment decision:
where ∆ is the first difference operator (e.g., ∆z t = z t − z t−1 ), the notationx t denotes (17), (22), (21), (20), and c k =C K is derived as 
where the coefficients γ 1 , γ 2 , γ µ1 , γ ν1 , γ µ2 , and γ ν2 are reported in Appendix A.
Further, as we show in the Appendix, the structural parameters (which are functions of the deep parameters) satisfy the restrictions that γ 1 > 0, γ 2 > 0, and γ 1 + γ 2 < 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 1 is the key to obtaining all of our theoretical results, as is shown in the next section.
IV. REE vs. SCE: Theoretic Results
In this section, we derive the closed-form solutions for both the REE and the SCE.
The key is to solve (29); the solution depends on how agents form expectations of the endogenous accumulation process of capital. Once this solution is obtained, it is relatively straightforward to derive the closed-form solutions for the other variables, which are reported in Appendix A.
For the REE solution, we have the following result.
Proposition 2. The solution to the second-order differential equation (29) under the rational expectations assumption iŝ
where
Furthermore, this solution is stationary and unique.
Proof. See Appendix C.
If we replace the capital-accumulation Euler equation (27) by the closed-form expression (30), the system of equations (23)- (26) and (30) 
where for all i ≥ 0,
We now assume that agents have adaptive expectations. We follow Marcet and Nicolini (2003) and Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2006a) to replace E tkt+1 byÊ tkt+1 such thatÊ tkt+1 =β t . Agents update their beliefsβ t using the following constant-gain learning (CGL) algorithm:β
where 0 < g < 1 is a gain representing how fast past observations are discounted in the learning regression.
The dynamics ofk t produced by (29) under the above learning algorithm (32) follow the processk
In self-confirming equilibrium, beliefs are not contradicted by observations along the equilibrium path (Sargent, 1999) . To find an SCE is to solve a fixed-point problem.
For our model, the solution to the SCE is to find the fixed pointβ that solves the orthogonality condition
where E( ) is a mathematical unconditional expectation operator andk t itself is a function of the beliefβ in self-confirming equilibrium such that
Proposition 3. As g → 0, the belief sequence {β t } in (32) converges weakly to the unique and stationary SCE given byβ = 0 for all admissible values of the deep parameters.
Proof. From (33) one can see thatk t is a function of current and past beliefs and fundamental shocks. We denote this function as κ( ) such that
We can then rewrite the CGL algorithm (32) aŝ
To prove that (34) holds atβ = 0 and the fixed pointβ = 0 is unique, we denote the left-hand-side term in (34) by
Under our assumptions, it follows from Kushner and Yin (1997) that as g → 0, the beliefsβ t in (35) converge weakly to the solution of the ordinary differential equation
One can further show that
Since γ 1 > 0, γ 2 > 0, and γ 2 + γ 1 < 1, the ODE has a unique fixed point atβ = 0.
The ODE is stable since
As one can see from Proposition 3, the SCE is exactly the same as the rational expectations steady state. Since an SCE is a limit of adaptive (learning) dynamics, it is important to characterize these dynamics and to study whether they are significantly different from dynamics under rational expectations. We rewrite the stochastic processes (32) and (33) as
Given the initial beliefβ −1 , the initial capital stockk −1 , and the shock processes, the bivariate autoregressive process (36) determines the belief and capital dynamics jointly; then, (23)- (26) in Section III, or (A1)-(A4) in Appendix A, determine the dynamics of investment, labor, output, and consumption. Clearly this learning model is linear and consequently the impulse responses do not depend on initial conditions. In Section VI, we discuss an alternative learning rule that nests the rational-expectations solution and show that the results do depend on initial conditions and the size of the gain.
We now provide a result showing that the linear system represented by the above learning model is stationary.
Proposition 4. The learning dynamics, described by (23)- (26) and (36) for g ∈ (0, 1), are stationary for all admissible values of the deep parameters.
Proof. Given (A1)-(A4) in Appendix A that characterize the dynamics of investment, labor, output, and consumption as a function ofk t , it suffices to show that (36) is a stationary process. The two characteristic roots of the 2 × 2 coefficient matrix ofβ t−1 andk t−1 on the right-hand side of (36) are
Since γ 1 > 0, γ 2 > 0, and γ 1 +γ 2 < 1 for all admissible values of the deep parameters, it follows that both λ 1 and λ 2 are real numbers and for any g ∈ (0, 1), 0 < λ 1 < λ 2 < 1.
Hence, the adaptive process for {β t ,k t }, given by (36), is stationary.
Proposition 4 implies that the learning dynamics studied in this paper remain in the domain of attraction of the SCE (the rational expectations steady state) and thus the probability of escapes from the SCE is very small.
To assess how different the learning dynamics differ from dynamics under rational expectations, we derive the belief and capital dynamics under the CGL as
where L is the lag operator. It follows from (37) that
This can be simplified tô
If ρ ν = λ 1 or λ 2 , and ρ µ = λ 1 or λ 2 , then it simplifies further tô
On the other hand, we can compute the rational expectations from (31) as
A comparison of (40) and (41) shows that, although the SCE is the same as the steady state REE, the dynamics of the beliefsβ t can be different from the dynamics of the expectations E tkt+1 . These differences lead to quantitatively important differences in the dynamics of other macroeconomic variables, as we show in the next section.
V. REE vs. SCE: Transmission of Technology Shocks
We now analyze the transmission mechanisms of the model under both rational and adaptive expectations. We discuss simulated results based on a few sets of parameter values, but the quantitative differences between learning and rational expectations dynamics exist for a wide range of values. The model parameters include β, the subjective discount factor; α, the labor share of income; δ, the capital depreciation rate; η, the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply; λ z and λ q , the average growth rate of the neutral and biased technologies; ξ, the weight parameter in the preferences for leisure; ρ ν , ρ µ , σ ν , and σ µ , the parameters controlling the shock processes, and g, the constant gain in the learning process.
V.1. Benchmark parameter values. Table 1 summarizes the benchmark parameter values that we use for our simulations. The model that we have in mind has a quarterly frequency. We set α = 0.7, corresponding to a labor income share of 70%.
We set λ q = 1.008 such that the investment-specific technology grows at an annual rate of 3.2%, as suggested by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) . We set λ z = 1.0016 such that, given our value of λ q and α, real per capita GDP grows at an annual rate of 2% on the path of balanced growth.
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We set δ = 0.03, so that the annual depreciation rate of capital is 12%. We follow the business cycle literature and set β = 0.99. We use a value of ξ = 3.17 so that the steady state working hours are about 1/3 of the representative agent's time endowment. We follow Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) and assume that labor is indivisible, implying that η = 0.
For the parameters in the shock processes, we set ρ ν = ρ µ = 0.95, σ ν = 0.01, and σ µ = 0.005. These standard-deviation values are consistent with the estimates in the empirical literature (e.g., Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2008) The responses of aggregate variables to a neutral technology shock in the rational expectations model should be familiar to a student of real business cycle studies.
As the solid line in the figure shows, output rises on impact and declines gradually.
Consumption, investment, hours, the real wage, and the real interest rate all comove with output. In the impact period, consumption responds less and investment responds more than does output. These patterns of responses are consistent with the stylized facts about business cycles.
A well documented difficulty facing the standard RBC model with rational expectations lies in the labor market dynamics (Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992 ). The RBC model typically fails to generate the observed large responses of labor hours and small responses of the real wage following a neutral technology shock. In the RBC model, a positive neutral technology shock raises the demand for labor at any given 5 The average growth rate for output in the model is given by λ z λ
real wage so that the labor demand schedule shifts out, creating a substitution effect.
Thus, holding the labor supply schedule unchanged, the substitution effect drives up both hours and the real wage. In the mean time, since the shock is persistent and therefore raises future productivity, it creates a wealth effect that raises current consumption and thus shifts the labor supply curve up. The wealth effect partially cancels out the substitution effect on hours, rendering the responses of equilibrium hours small; meanwhile, the wealth effect reinforces the substitution effect on the real wage, pushing up the equilibrium wage sharply. As shown by Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) , labor indivisibility flattens the labor supply curve and thus magnifies the substitution effect following the positive neutral technology shock, although the wealth effect still makes the real wage rise sharply.
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As is evident in Figure 1 and in Table 2 , the model with rational expectations implies that the initial response of hours is about 67% of that of output and the magnitude of the real wage response about 33% of that of output response. Indeed, as shown in Table 2 , in the rational expectations model, the cumulative responses of hours at longer forecasting horizons (from 4 quarter through 24 quarters) are less than 58% and those of the real wages are more than 42% relative to the output responses.
Introducing learning helps alleviate some of the problems for the RBC model, especially for the labor market variables. The dashed lines in Figure 1 display the impulse responses of the aggregate variables in the model with adaptive expectations following a positive neutral technology shock. As in the rational expectations model, the shock raises the demand for labor at any given wage and this substitution effect leads to a rise in both hours and the real wage. Unlike the rational expectations model, however, the wealth effect is dampened because agents form expectations about future productivity and capital based on past observations. Consequently, on impact, consumption does not rise as much and thus the labor supply curve does not shift as much as in the rational expectations model. By dampening the wealth effect of the shock, the learning mechanism leads to a greater response of equilibrium hours and a smaller response of equilibrium real wage than those in the rational expectations model. Table 2 output are, at least in the short run (up to 4 quarters), much smaller than those in the rational expectations model .
To the extent that some other frictions such as habit formation can also slow down the adjustment in consumption, one might wonder whether or not habit formation can help alleviate the labor market puzzle as does our learning mechanism. Lettau and Uhlig (2000) show that habit formation slows down the adjustments of consumption for all periods, not just for the current period. As the agent desires slow adjustments of consumption in all future periods, he does not want to work hard in the current period to accumulate capital. Thus, a positive neutral technology shock leads to a small increase in hours and a large increase in the marginal product of labor and the real wage. In this sense, introducing habit formation can actually deepen the labor market puzzle. In contrast, the model with adaptive expectations that we consider here contains a very different propagation mechanism and helps alleviate the labor market puzzle.
Introducing adaptive expectations in the model also helps amplify the responses of other aggregate variables. As shown in Figure 1 , under adaptive expectations, the sharp rise in hours following the positive productivity shock leads to a sharp rise in output. As consumption does not change much on impact, investment rises sharply.
The amplified response of investment implies amplified responses of the capital stock and the beliefs of future capital stocks relative to the rational expectations model.
In summary, following a neutral technology shock, introducing learning amplifies the response of hours and dampens the responses of the real wage. Furthermore, learning helps amplify the effects of the neutral technology shock on output, investment, and capital.
V.2.2. Biased technology shock.
There is a large literature on the macroeconomic effects of investment-specific technology shocks in the context of rational-expectations.
Examples include Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000) , Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull, and Violante (2000), Fisher (2006) , and He and Liu (2008) . In this section, we examine the effects of biased technology shocks in the context of adaptive expectations.
In Figure 2 , we plot the impulse responses of the same set of macroeconomic variables following a positive one-standard-deviation shock to the biased technology. In both the rational expectations model (solid lines) and the adaptive expectations model (dashed lines), the shock leads to a rise in output, investment, hours, capital stock, and the real interest rate, and a short-run decline in consumption and the real wage.
As the biased shock raises the efficiency of investment, current investment becomes cheaper relative to consumption. Thus, this type of shock, unlike the neutral technology shock, shifts resources from consumption to investment. Consequently, investment rises and consumption declines for several periods. The decline in consumption shifts the labor supply curve down. Since the neutral technology stays unchanged and aggregate capital stock is predetermined, the labor demand curve does not shift.
Thus, the downward shift of the labor supply curve lowers the real wage and raises equilibrium hours. The rise in labor hours helps produce more output and raise the marginal product of capital, so that the real interest rate rises as well. This mechanism operates under both rational expectations and adaptive expectations.
The patterns of the impulse responses following a positive biased technology shock are broadly consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004) , except that consumption and the real wage in the model do not comove with output whereas consumption is weakly procyclical and the real wage is acyclical in the data based on VAR studies. The lack of comovement in the model is not surprising since Barro and King (1984) show that the standard one-sector growth model can generate comovement only in the presence of contemporaneous total factor productivity shocks (i.e., the neutral technology shocks in our model). It is possible to fix the comovement problem by introducing several sources of frictions in the model (see, for example, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008) ). We do not introduce other frictions because we would like to isolate the role of learning, which itself acts as a friction, in propagating technology shocks.
The main difference between the learning model and the rational expectations model is that, with learning in place of full rationality, agents do not perfectly foresee the increase in the future level of investment technology. They respond to the persistent shock as though it had only a temporary effect. The wealth effect is thus dampened and the intertemporal substitution effect strengthened. Consequently, in the learning model, the biased technology shock leads to a greater rise in investment and a greater decline in consumption than that in the rational expectations model.
The sharp decline in consumption amplifies the decline in the real wage and the rise in hours. The amplified increase in hours in turn leads to a sharp rise in output and thus in the real interest rate. These patterns are shown in Figure 2 .
In summary, introducing learning can substantially amplify the responses of all the aggregate variables following a biased technology shock. Overall, relaxing the assumption of perfect rationality helps give a larger role to both neutral and biased technology shocks in shaping business cycles. Moreover, with the less persistent shock, the responses of both consumption and the real wage display a clear hump shape; the responses of investment, hours, and the real interest rate all display an inverted hump shape; and output rises in the impact period and declines monotonically thereafter. Under adaptive expectations, the representative agent is backward looking when forming expectations. In the impact period, the wealth effect of the shock is muted; the intertemporal substitution effect induced by the rise in the real interest rate makes consumption more expensive and saving more attractive. Thus, in the short run, consumption rises by less and investment rises by more than in the rational expectations model. Overtime, however, the agent learns about the wealth effect of the positive technology shock while the intertemporal substitution effect becomes weaker as the real interest rate goes back to its steady state. Thus, consumption rises further before it begins to decline back to the steady state. The rise in consumption shifts the labor supply curve up and thus lowers labor hours and raises the real wage. As consumption climbs to its peak over time, hours and investment fall to the trough and the real wage rises to the peak.
7 To conserve space, we do not report the impulse responses following the biased technology shock here. The responses are qualitatively similar to those in the benchmark model, although the amplification effects of learning become smaller as the shock is less persistent than that in the benchmark model.
Since output falls back to the steady state over time, consumption, investment, and hours return gradually to the steady state.
In summary, with less persistent shocks, the wealth effect in the rational expectations model becomes weaker and accordingly the amplification effect of adaptive expectations become weaker as well. The adaptive expectations model generates pronounced hump-shaped responses while the rational expectations model does not.
VI. An Alternative Learning Rule
One interesting question is whether our main findings hinge on the particular learning rule (32). There are many alternative learning mechanisms, such as least-square learning (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) , Bayesian updating through Kalman filtering (Sargent and Williams, 2005) , and signal extraction when agents are confused between shocks to the level or to the growth rate of the technology (Edge, Laubach, and Williams, 2007) . We focus on one particular constant-gain learning rule that has the same specification as the rational expectations solution (30). Specifically, we replace E tkt+1 byÊ tkt+1 such thatÊ
Agents update their beliefs α t+1|t using the following recursive algorithm:
As g → 0, the equilibrium under this adaptive learning approaches the rational expectations equilibrium and is therefore E-stable in the usual sense of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) . Unlike the benchmark learning rule studied in Section IV, this alternative rule is updated nonlinearly and thus short-run dynamic results can be quite different for different initial conditions. This point is discussed in Carceles-
Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007). One particular type of initial conditions studied by
Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007) is to generate the initial data, {x 0 , . . . ,x t 0 }, from the equilibrium solution to the rational-expectations model.
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The initial conditions can then be computed as
With these initial conditions, one can update the beliefs recursively according to (42) and (43). We simulate the model under the benchmark parameter values summarized
in Table 1 and we also examine the sensitivity of the learning equilibrium to changes in the initial conditions and the size of the gain parameter.
When the gain is small and the initial data set is large, the differences between the dynamics under learning and those under rational expectations tend to be very small. This result is consistent with the findings in Williams (2003) and Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007) . In a recent paper, Eusepi and Preston (2008) show that learning can nonetheless amplify the dynamic responses if one relaxes the standard assumption that agents use only one-period ahead forecasts to form their beliefs.
We argue that even with the standard learning mechanism (42)-(43), different gain values or different initial conditions can produce qualitatively different impulse responses. In this section we focus on cases where adaptive learning under this sophisticated rule can amplify the dynamic responses of aggregate variables to a neutral technology shock, generate negative responses of hours, and produce procyclical movements of consumption and output.
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As the gain parameter increases, the sophisticated learning rule can amplify the dynamic responses to a technology shock in the same magnitude as does the simple learning mechanism studied in Section V. Figure 5 displays such an example, where we set g = 0.05 and t 0 = 10000. As one can see, the impulse responses under our alternative learning are qualitatively similar to those under the benchmark learning rule shown in Figure 1 .
8 With imperfectly rational agents, it seems logically incoherent to generate the initial data.
Nonetheless, we follow this approach in the literature to make our work comparable. 9 To conserve space, we do not present the impulse responses following the biased technology shock under the alternative learning rule. These results are similar to those displayed in Figure 2 .
It is important to note that the dynamics under nonlinear learning are in general sensitive not only to changes in initial conditions and the size of the gain, as found by Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007) , but also to changes in some of the deep parameters.
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Consider a case with a smaller sample of initial data (t 0 = 100 instead of 10000) and with a smaller Frisch elasticity of labor supply (η = 2 instead of 0). Figure 6 shows the impulse responses to a positive neutral technology shock in this case. The results reveal that the learning model is capable of generating negative responses of labor hours following a neutral technology shock even in this one-sector growth model that abstracts from other frictions such as habit formation and investment adjustment costs considered by, for example, Francies and Ramey (2005) . In response to the neutral technology shock, consumption rises more and output rises less in the learning model than in the rational-expectations model. The sharp rise in consumption shifts the labor supply curve up so much that the real wage rises sharply and the hours fall. In the mean time, the sharp rise in consumption and the modest rise in output leads to a smaller rise in investment than that in the rational expectations model.
The most interesting result is that hours can decline following a positive neutral technology shock in the learning model, whereas the responses of hours are always positive under rational expectations. Recent empirical work has documented evidence in favor of negative responses of hours to a positive neutral technology shock (e.g., Galí (1999) and Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) ). Learning, serving as a friction, is capable of generating the responses of investment and hours similar to Francies and Ramey (2005) , where investment-adjustment costs and habit are introduced into a standard real-business-cycle model as alternative frictions.
In summary, the exercise in this section shows that the sophisticated learning rule has much flexibility to amplify the effects of technology shocks and produce qualitatively different transmission mechanisms than does the rational-expectations model.
Since this learning mechanism is nonlinear, not only changes in initial conditions and the size of the gain can alter the equilibrium dynamics, changes in the size of shock variance can also affect the dynamics considerably. In future work, therefore, 10 Our sophisticated learning rule is similar to the one studied by Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007), who also examine the role of learning in a stochastic growth model. As in CarcelesPoveda and Giannitsarou (2007), we find that the dynamics are sensitive to changes in the initial conditions and the size of the gain. Different from Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007), we focus on the model's ability to generate plausible labor market dynamics, whereas Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007) assumes inelastically supplied labor.
we would like to estimate the initial conditions, the variances, and the gain parameters along with other model parameters, as proposed in Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2006b) .
VII. Conclusion
We have studied a standard stochastic growth model with adaptive expectations in which beliefs are decoupled from decision rules. For the benchmark learning rule studied in Marcet and Nicolini (2003) These results hold true with a more sophisticated learning rule under certain initial conditions.
Our results suggest that the learning mechanism is flexible enough to generate some realistic features in a simple one-sector growth model. Our findings also suggest that, to gauge the full potential of the learning mechanism in propagating the shocks in the growth model, one would need to jointly estimate the initial conditions with the gain parameter and other deep parameters. We hope our work helps motivate future empirical studies on the importance of learning.
The coefficients in (29) in Proposition 1 are defined as:
The steady state ratios such as c k and i k have been derived in Section III. One can verify that, for all admissible values of the deep parameters, that is, for any
, and λ q ≥ 1, all the steady-state ratios are well-defined and positive, and so are γ 1 and γ 2 .
The closed-form solutions for investment, hours, output, and consumption are derived as the the following system of equations under either rational or adaptive ex-
It is clear how the equilibrium can be solved. Once the solution for capital is obtained, as shown in Section IV, Equation (A1) can be used to solve for investment, (A2) for labor, (A3) for output, and (A4) for consumption.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1
By successive substitutions in (23)- (27), one can derive (29). Specific steps are described below.
We begin by first deriving the following two relations from (25) and (26):
Substituting (A5) into (23), we get:
Substituting (A7) into (24) yieldŝ
Substituting (A6) and (A7) into (27) yields
Rewrite (A8) asl
It follows that
Substituting (A10) and (A11) into (A9), and rearranging, we get
Further simplifying, we get
Simplifying further, we havê
which gives the results in Appendix A.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2
Because (29) is a second-order differential equation, there are only two solutions.
We will show, next, that one solution is stationary and the other explosive. Thus, there is a unique stationary solution.
The coefficient a in (30) takes on one of the following two values:
We can verify that γ 1 > 0 and γ 2 > 0 for all admissible values of the deep parameters.
We can further show that γ 1 + γ 2 < 1 if and only if β(1 − δ) < λ z λ 1/α q , which holds too for all admissible values of the deep parameters.
Since γ 1 > 0, γ 2 > 0, γ 1 + γ 2 < 1, we have γ 1 ∈ (0, 1), γ 2 ∈ (0, 1), and 4γ 1 γ 2 < 1. It follows that a 1 and a 2 are real numbers. Knowing the above ranges for γ 1 and γ 2 , we can in fact show that a 1 ∈ (0, 1) and a 2 > 1. We can then verify that (ρ ν + a 1 )γ 1 < 1 and (ρ µ + a 1 )γ 1 < 1, which imply that γ 1 a 1 < 1, and so the solution prescribed by a = a 1 above corresponds to a (unique) stationary rational expectations equilibrium.
11
Given the initial conditionk −1 and the driving processes, (30) completely pins down capital, and then (A1), (A2), (A3), and (A4) determine investment, labor, output, and consumption, respectively. From now on, whenever we mention REE, we refer to this stationary REE, where we also write a 1 simply as a. 11 We can also show that, provided ρ ν = a 1 and ρ µ = a 1 , the solution prescribed by a = a 2 above corresponds to an explosive path. 
